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Abstract
Security organizations often attempt to disrupt terror or insurgent
networks by targeting “high value targets” (HVT’s). However,
there have been numerous examples that illustrate how such net-
works are able to quickly re-generate leadership after such an op-
eration. Here, we introduce the notion of a shaping operation in
which the terrorist network is first targeted for the purpose of reduc-
ing its leadership re-generation ability before targeting HVT’s. We
look to conduct shaping by maximizing the network-wide degree
centrality through node removal. We formally define this prob-
lem and prove solving it is NP-Complete. We introduce a mixed
integer-linear program that solves this problem exactly as well as a
greedy heuristic for more practical use. We implement the greedy
heuristic and found in examining five real-world terrorist networks
that removing only 12% of nodes can increase the network-wide
centrality between 17% and 45%. We also show our algorithm can
scale to large social networks of 1, 133 nodes and 5, 541 edges on
commodity hardware.
I Introduction
Terrorist and insurgent networks are known for their ability to re-
generate leadership after targeted attacks. For example, the infa-
mous Al Qaeda in Iraq terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was
killed on June 8th, 2006 1 only to be replaced with Abu Ayyub al-
Masri about a week later. 2 Here, we introduce the notion of a shap-
ing operation in which the terrorist network is first targeted for the
purpose of reducing its leadership re-generation ability. Such shap-
ing operations would then be followed by normal attacks against
high value targets – however the network would be less likely to
recover due to the initial shaping operations. In this paper, we look
to shape such networks by increasing network-wide centrality, first
1http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/middleeast/08cnd-iraq.html? r=1
2http://articles.cnn.com/2006-06-15/world/iraq.main 1 al-zarqawi-al-qaeda-
leader-zawahiri? s=PM:WORLD
introduced in [1]. Intuitively, this measure provides insight into
the criticality of high-degree nodes. Hence, a network with a low
network-wide centrality is a more decentralized organization and
likely to regenerate leadership. In the shaping operations intro-
duced in this paper, we seek to target nodes that will maximize this
measure - making follow-on attacks against leadership more effec-
tive. Previous work has primarily dealt with the problem of lead-
ership regeneration by focusing on individuals likely to emerge as
new leaders [2]. However, targeting or obtaining information about
certain individuals may not always be possible. Hence, in this pa-
per, we target nodes that affect the reduce the network’s ability
regenerate leadership as a whole.
The main contributions of this paper is the introduction of a for-
mal problem we call FRAGILITY (Section II) which seeks to find
a set of nodes whose removal would maximize the network-wide
centrality. We also included in the problem a “no strike list” - nodes
in the network that cannot be targeted for various reasons. This is
because real-world targeting of terrorist or insurgent networks of-
ten includes restrictions against certain individuals. We also prove
that this problem is NP-complete (and the associated optimization
problem is NP-hard) which means that an efficient algorithm to
solve it optimally is currently unknown. We then provide two al-
gorithms for solving this problem (Section III). Our first algorithm
is an integer program that ensures an exact solution and, though
intractable by our complexity result, may be amenable to an in-
teger program solver. Then we introduce a greedy heuristic that
we show experimentally (in Section IV) to provide good results
in practice (as we demonstrate on six different real-world terrorist
networks) and scales to networks of 1, 133 nodes and 5, 541 edges.
In examining five real-world terrorist networks, we found that suc-
cessful targetting operations against only 12% (or less) of nodes
can increase the network-wide centrality between 17% and 45%.
Additionally, we discuss related work further in Section V.
We would like to note that the targeting of individuals in a ter-
rorist or insurgent network does not necessarily mean to that they
should be killed. In fact, for “shaping operations” as the ones de-
scribed in this paper, the killing of certain individuals in the net-
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II TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES AND COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
work may be counter-productive. This is due to the fact that the
capture of individuals who are likely emergent leaders may pro-
vide further intelligence on the organization in question.
II Technical Preliminaries and Computa-
tional Complexity
We assume that an undirected social network is represented by the
graph G = (V,E). Additionally, we assume a “no strike” set,
S ⊆ V . Intuitively, these are nodes in a terrorist/insurgent net-
work that cannot be targeted. This set is a key part of our frame-
work, as real-world targeting of terrorist and/or insurgents in a ter-
rorist/insurgent network is often accompanied by real-world con-
straints. For example, consider the following:
• We may know an individual’s relationships in the terror-
ist/insurgent network, but may not have enough information
(i.e. where he or she may reside, enough evidence, etc.) to
actually target him or her.
• The potential target may be politically sensitive.
• The potential target may have fled the country or area of
operations but still maintains his or her role in the terror-
ist/insurgent network through electronic communication.
• The potential “target” may actually be a source of intelligence
and/or part of an ongoing counter-intelligence operation (i.e.
as described in [3]).
Throughout this paper we will also use the following notation.
The symbols NG,MG will denote the sizes of V,E respectively.
For each i ∈ V , we will use di to denote the degree of that node
(the number of individuals he/she is connected to) and ηi to denote
the set of neighbors and we extend this notation for subsets of V
(for V ′ ⊆ V, η(V ′) = ⋃i∈V ′ ηi). We will use the notation κi to
denote all edges in E that are adjacent to node i and the notation
d∗G to denote the maximum degree of the network. Given some
subset V ′ ⊆ V , we will use the notation G(V ′) to denote the sub-
graph of G induced by V ′. We describe an example network in
Example II.1.
Example II.1 Consider network Gsam in Figure 1. Nodes a and b
may be leaders of a strategic cell that provides guidance to attack
cells (nodes c-f and g-j). Note that no members in the attack cells
are linked to each other. Also note that if node a is the leader, and
targeted, he could easily be replaced by b.
A Network-Wide Degree Centrality
We now introduce the notion of network-wide degree centrality as
per [1]. The key intuition of this paper is to use this centrality as a
measure of the network’s ability to re-generate leadership.
Figure 1: Sample network (Gsam) for Example II.1.
Definition II.1 (Network-Wide Degree Centrality [1]) The de-
gree centrality of a network G, denoted CG is defined as:
CG =
∑
i d
∗
G − di
(NG − 1)(NG − 2) (1)
We note that there are other types of network-wide centrality (i.e.
network-wide betweenness, closeness, etc.). We leave the consid-
eration of these alternate definitions of network-wide centrality to
future work. Freeman [1] shows that for a star network, the quan-
tity
∑
i d
∗
G−di equals (NG−1)(NG−2) - and this is the maximum
possible value for this quantity. Hence, the value for CG can be at
most 1. As this equation is clearly always positive, network-wide
degree centrality is a scalar in [0, 1]. Turning back to Example II.1,
we can compute CGsam = 0.38 - which seems to indicate that in
this particular terrorist/insurgent network that, after leadership is
targeted, there is a cadre of second-tier individuals who can even-
tually take control of the organization. Throughout this paper, we
find it useful to manipulate Equation 1 as follows.
CG =
NGd
∗
G − 2MG
(NG − 1)(NG − 2) (2)
We notice that the centrality of a network really depends on
three things: number of nodes, number of edges, and the highest
degree of any node in the network. We leverage this re-arranged
equation in many of our proofs. Further, we will use the function
fragileG : V → < to denote the level of network-wide of the
graph after some set of nodes is removed. Hence, fragileG(V ′) =
CG(V−V ′). We note that this function has some interesting char-
acteristics. For example, for some subset V ′ ⊂ V and element
i ∈ V −V ′, it is possible that fragileG(V ′) > fragile(V ′ ∪{i})
or fragileG(V ′) < fragile(V ′ ∪ {i}), hence fragileG is not
necessarily monotonic or anti-monotonic in this sense. Further,
given some additional element j ∈ V − V ′, it is possible that
fragileG(V
′ ∪ {j})− fragileG(V ′) > fragileG(V ′ ∪ {i, j})−
2
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fragileG(V
′ ∪ {j}) or fragileG(V ′ ∪ {j}) − fragileG(V ′) <
fragileG(V
′ ∪ {i, j}) − fragileG(V ′ ∪ {j}). Hence, fragileG
is not necessarily sub- or super- modular either. Consider Exam-
ple II.2.
Example II.2 Consider the network Gsam in Figure 1.
Here, fragileGsam(∅) = 0.33, fragileGsam({a}) =
fragileGsam({b}) = 0.57, fragileGsam({c}) = 0.30, and
fragileGsam({a, b}) = 0.0. The fact that fragileGsam({c} <
fragileGsam(∅) and fragileGsam({a} > fragileGsam(∅)
illustrate that fragileGsam is not necessarily monotonic or
anti-monotonic. Now let us consider the incremental increase of
adding an additional element. Adding a to ∅ causes fragileGsam
to increase by 0.24 while adding a to {b} ⊃ ∅ causes fragileGsam
to decrease by 0.57 - implying sub-modularity. However, adding
c to ∅ causes fragileGsam to decrease by 0.03 while adding
c to set {a, b} ⊃ ∅ causes fragileGsam to increase by 0.1 (as
fragileGsam({a, b, c} = 0.1) - implying super-modularity. Hence,
fragileGsam is not necessarily sub- or super- modular.
B Problems and Complexity Results
We now have all the pieces to introduce our problems of interest.
We include decision and optimization versions.
FRAGILITY (k, x,G, S):
INPUT: Natural number k, real number x, network G = (V,E),
and no-strike set S
OUTPUT: “Yes” if there exists set V ′ ⊆ V − S s.t. |V ′| ≤ k and
fragileG(V
′) > x – “no” otherwise.
FRAGILITY OPT (k,G, S):
INPUT: Natural number k, network G = (V,E), and no-strike set
S
OUTPUT: Set V ′ ⊆ V − S s.t. |V ′| ≤ k s.t. 6 ∃V ′′ ⊆ V − S s.t.
|V ′′| ≤ k and fragileG(V ′′) > fragileG(V ′).
As our problems seek to find sets of nodes, rather than individ-
ual ones, it raises the question of “how difficult are these prob-
lems.” We prove that FRAGILITY is NP-Complete - mean-
ing an efficient algorithm to solve it optimally is currently un-
known. Following directly from this result is the NP-hardness of
FRAGILITY OPT . Below we state and prove this result.
Theorem 1 (Complexity of FRAGILITY ) FRAGILITY is
NP-Complete.
Proof. Membership in NP is trivial, consider a set V ′ of size k, –
clearly we can calculate fragileG(V ′) in polynomial time.
Next we consider the vertex-cover (V C) problem and show that it
can be embedded into an instance of FRAGILITY . In the V C
problem, the input consists of undirected graph G∗ = (V ∗, E∗)
and natural number k. The output is “yes” iff there is a set
V ∗∗ ⊆ V ∗ of size at most k s.t. for all (i, j) ∈ E∗, either i
or j (or both) are in V ∗. This problem is well-known to be NP-
hard. First we create a new network G = (V,E) which con-
sists of graph G∗ but with NG∗ + 2 additional nodes which form
a star that is disconnected from the rest of the network. All of
the new nodes are put in the no-strike set S (part of the input
of FRAGILITY ). Clearly, the center of this star is always the
most central node in the graph, no matter what is removed from set
V − S. This allows us to treat d∗G as a constant equal to NG + 1.
Also note that with this construction, for both problems, if a so-
lution exists of less than size k, there also exists a solution of ex-
actly size k. Further, we note that for any subset of V whose re-
moval does not affect the overall maximal degree of the network
(which is any node outside the set S - hence in some correspond-
ing subset of V ∗ in the graph of the dominating set problem), when
some set V ′ (of size k) is removed from V , the network-wide de-
gree centrality for the resulting graph can be expressed as follows:
fragileG(V
′) = (NG−k)(NG+1)−2(MG−|
⋃
i∈V ′ κi|)
(NG−k−1)(NG−k−2) .
The proof of correctness of the embedding rests on proving that a
“yes” answer is returned for the vertex cover problem iff
FRAGILITY (k, (NG−k)(NG+1)−2NG∗−2(NG−k−1)(NG−k−2) , G, S) = “yes”.
First, suppose by way of contradiction (BWOC) there is a “yes”
answer to the V C problem and a “no” answer to the corresponding
FRAGILITY problem. Let V ∗∗ be the set of nodes that cause
a “yes” answer to V C. If we remove the corresponding nodes
from G, there are NG∗ + 1 edges left in that network. Hence, as
this is a set of size k (thus, meeting the cardinality requirement of
FRAGILITY then fragileG(V ∗∗) =
(NG−k)(NG+1)−2NG∗−4
(NG−k−1)(NG−k−2)
which would cause a “yes” answer for FRAGILITY – hence a
contradiction.
Going the other direction, suppose BWOC there is a “yes” answer
to the FRAGILITY problem and a “no” answer to the corre-
sponding V C problem. Let V ′ be the nodes in the solution to
FRAGILITY . Clearly, this set is of size k and by how we set
up the no-strike list (S), there are corresponding nodes in G∗∗. As
these nodes cause a “yes” answer to FRAGILITY , they result in
the removal of MG∗ number of edges in G. By the construction,
none of these edges are adjacent to nodes in S. Hence, there are
corresponding edges in G∗. As this is also the number of edges
in G∗, then this set is also a vertex cover - hence a contradiction.
Hence, as we have shown membership in NP and that this problem
is at least as hard as the dominating set problem (resulting in NP
hardness), the statement of the theorem follows.
Corollary 1 (Hardness of FRAGILITY OPT )
FRAGILITY OPT is NP-hard
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 1.
III Algorithms
Now with the problems and their complexity identified, we pro-
ceed to develop algorithms to solve them. First, we develop an
integer program that, if solved exactly, will produce an optimal
3
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solution. We note that solving a general integer program is also
NP-hard. Hence, an exact solution will likely take exponential
time. However, good approximation techniques such as branch-
and-bound exist and mature tools such as QSopt and CPLEX can
readily take and approximate solutions to integer programs. We
follow our integer program formulation with a greedy heuristic.
Though we cannot guarantee that the greedy heuristic provides an
optimal solution, it often provides a natural approach to approxi-
mating many NP-hard optimization problems.
A Integer Program
Our first algorithm is presented in the form of an integer program.
The idea is that certain variables in the integer program correspond
with the nodes in the original network that can be set to either 0
or 1. An objective function, which mirrors the fragile function
is then maximized. When this function is maximized, all nodes
associated with a 1 variable are picked as the solution.
Definition III.1 (FRAGILITY IP ) For each i ∈ V , create
variables Xi, Zi. For each undirected edge ij ∈ E, create three
variables: Yij , Qij , Qji. Note that the edge is considered in only
“one direction” for the Y variables and both directions for the Q
variables. We define the FRAGILITY IP integer program as
follows:
max
(NG−
∑
iXi)
∑
ij Qij−2
∑
ij Yij
(NG−1−
∑
iXi)(NG−2−
∑
iXi)
Subject to: ∑
iXi ≤ k (3)∑
i Zi = 1 (4)
∀ij ∈ E Yij ≤ 1−Xi (5)
∀ij ∈ E Yij ≤ 1−Xj (6)
∀ij ∈ E Qij ≤ Yij (7)
∀ij ∈ E Qij ≤ Yji (8)
∀ij ∈ E Qij ≤ Zi (9)
∀i ∈ V Zi ∈ {0, 1} (10)
∀i ∈ S Xi = 0 (11)
∀i ∈ V − S Xi ∈ {0, 1} (12)
Next we prove how many variables and constraints
FRAGILITY IP requires as well as prove that it provides
a correct solution to FRAGILITY OPT .
Proposition III.1 FRAGILITY IP has 2NG+3MG variables
and 2 + 2NG + 5MG constraints.
Proposition III.2 (1.) Given the vector X returned by
FRAGILITY IP , the set
⋃
Xi=1
i is a solution to
FRAGILITY OPT .
(2.)Given a solution V ′ to FRAGILITY OPT , ∀i ∈ S,X = 1
and ∀i /∈ S,X = 0 will maximize FRAGILITY IP .
Proof. (1.) Suppose, BWOC,
⋃
Xi=1
i is not an optimal solution
to FRAGILITY OPT . Then there is some V ′ 6= ⋃Xi=1 i that
is. Suppose ∀i ∈ S,X = 1 and ∀i /∈ S,X = 0. Clearly, by the
definition of a solution to FRAGILITY OPT , constraints 3,11
and 12 are all met. Constraints 5 and 6 set variables associated
with edges adjacent to nodes not in V ′ to 1. Hence, the quantity∑
ij Yij is equal to the number of edges in the network. The Y
edge variables (both of them for each edge) are also set in a similar
manner. Constraints 4,10 ensures that only one set of such edge
variables are set to 1. Hence, the quantity
∑
iXi)
∑
ij Qij is the
degree of one node in the network. As this quantity is present in the
objective function and non-negative, it corresponds to the d∗G. As
we note that
∑
iXi is equal to the number of nodes in G when V
′
is removed, we see that this function is fragileG. As this quantity
is maximized, we have a contradiction.
(2.) Suppose, BWOC, ∀i ∈ S,X = 1 and ∀i /∈ S,X = 0 is
not an optimal solution to FRAGILITY IP . Using the same
line of reasoning as above, we see that the objective function of
FRAGILITY IP is the same as fragileG, which also gives us
a contradiction.
Note that this integer program does not have a linear objec-
tive function. However, this can be accommodated for by instead
solving k different integer programs and taking the solution from
whichever one returns the greatest value for the objective function
(that is greater than the initial network-wide degree centrality, of
course). In this case, each integer program is identified with a nat-
ural number i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and the ith integer program has the
following objective function:
max
(NG−i)
∑
ij Qij−2
∑
ij Yij
(NG−1−i)(NG−2−i) (13)
As well as constraint 3 as follows:∑
iXi ≤ i (14)
Notice that now the quantities (NG− i) and (NG−1− i)(NG−
2 − i) can be treated as constants, making the objective function
linear. However, for networks with a heterogeneous degree distri-
bution where NG >> k, it is likely that only the integer program
for the case where i = k is needed as removing any node with
edges that is unconnected to a maximal degree node will result in
an increase in network-wide degree centrality.
Again, we stress that FRAGILITY IP provides an exact so-
lution. As integer-programming is also NP-hard, solving these
constraints is likely intractable unless P = NP . However, tech-
niques such as branch-and-bound and mature solvers such as QSopt
and CPLEX can provide good approximate solutions to such con-
straints. Even if the integer program must be linear, we can use the
techniques described above to solve k smaller integer programs or
obtaining an approximation by treating the terms involving the total
number of nodes in the resulting graph (in the objective function)
as constants. Additionally, a relaxation of the above constraints
where Zi and Xi variables lie in the interval [0, 1] is solvable in
polynomial time and would provide a lower-bound on the solu-
tion to the problem (although this would likely be a loose bound in
many cases).
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B A Greedy Heuristic
The integer program introduced in the last section can be lever-
aged by an integer-program solver for an approximate solution to
FRAGILITY OPT . However, it likely will not scale well to ex-
tremely large networks. Therefore, we introduce a greedy heuristic
to find an approximate solution. The ideas is to iteratively pick the
node in the network that provides the greatest increase in fragile
- and does not cause a decrease.
Algorithm 1 GREEDY FRAGILE
Require: Network G = (V,E), no-strike set S ⊆ V , cardinality
constraint k
Ensure: Subset V ′
1: V ′ = ∅
2: flag = TRUE
3: while |V ′| ≤ k and flag do
4: curBest = null, curBestScore = 0, haveV alidScore =
FALSE
5: for i ∈ V − (V ′ ∪ S) do
6: curScore = fragileG(V
′ ∪ {i})− fragileG(V ′)
7: if curScore ≥ curBestScore then
8: curBest = i
9: curBestScore = curScore
10: haveV alidScore = TRUE
11: end if
12: end for
13: if haveV alidScore = FALSE then
14: flag = FALSE
15: else
16: V ′ = V ′ ∪ {curBest}
17: end if
18: end while
19: return V ′.
The following two propositions describe characteristics of the
output and run-time of GREEDY FRAGILE, respectively.
Proposition III.3 If GREEDY FRAGILE returns a non-
empty solution (V ′), then |V ′| ≤ k and fragileG(V ′) >
fragileG(∅).
Proof. As the algorithm terminates its main loop once the cardi-
nality of the solution reaches k and as in each iteration, the variable
curBestScore is initialized as zero, the statement follows.
Proposition III.4 GREEDY FRAGILE runs in O(kN2G)
time.
Proof. We note that fragile is computed in O(NG) time as it
must update the node with the maximum degree. As the outer loop
of the algorithm iterates at most k times and the inner loop iterates
NG times, the statement follows.
Though our guarantees onGREEDY FRAGILE are limited,
we show that it performs well experimentally in the next section.
Example III.1 Following from Examples II.1-II.2 using the ter-
rorist/insurgent networkGsam from Figure 1, suppose a user wants
to identify 3 nodes that will cause the network to become “as fragile
as possible” and is able to target any node. Hence, he would like
to solve FRAGILE OPT (3, Gsam, ∅) and decides to do so us-
ing GREEDY FRAGILE. Initially, fragileGsam(∅) = 0.33.
In the first iteration, it selects and removes node a, increasing
the fragility (fragileGsam({a}) = 0.57). In the next itera-
tion, it selects node j, giving us fragileGsam({a, j}) = 0.57.
Finally, in the third iteration, it picks node c. This results in
fragileGsam({a, j, c}) = 0.6. The algorithm then terminates.
IV Implementation and Experiments
All experiments were run on a computer equipped with an Intel
Core 2 Duo CPU T9550 processor operating at 2.66 GHz (only
one core was used). The machine was running Microsoft Windows
7 (32 bit) and equipped with 4.0 GB of physical memory. We im-
plemented theGREEDY FRAGILE algorithm using Python 2.6 in
under 30 lines of code that leveraged the NetworkX library avail-
able from http://networkx.lanl.gov/.
We compared the results of the GREEDY FRAGILE to three
other more traditional approaches to targeting that rely on central-
ity measures from the literature. Specifically, we look at the top
closeness and betweenness nodes in the network. Given node i,
its closeness is the inverse of the average shortest path length from
node i to all other nodes in the graph. Betweenness, on the other
hand, is defined as the number of shortest paths between node pairs
that pass through i. Formal definitions of both of these measures
can be found in [4].
A Datasets
We studied the effects of our algorithm on five different datasets.
The network Tanzania [5] is a social network of the individuals
involved with the Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar
es Salaam in 1998. It was collected from newspaper accounts by
subject matter experts in the field. The remainder networks, Gen-
TerrorNw1-GenTerrorNw4 are terrorist networks generated from
real-world classified datasets[6, 7]. The Tanzania and the GenTer-
rorNw1-GenTerrorNw4 datasets used in our analysis were multi-
modal networks, meaning they contain multiple node classes such
as Agents, Resources, Locations, etc. The presence of the different
node classes generate multiple or meta networks, which, in their
original state, do not provide the single-mode Agent by Agent net-
work needed to test our algorithms. Johnson and McCulloh [8]
demonstrated a mathematical technique to convert meta networks
into single-mode networks without losing critical information. Us-
ing this methodology, we were able to derive distant relationships
between nodes as a series of basic matrix algebra operations on all
five networks. The result is an agent based social network of poten-
tial terrorist. Characteristics of the transformed networks of agent
node class only can be found in Table 1.
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Table 1: Network Datasets
Name Nodes Edges Density Avg. Degree
Tanzania 17 29 0.213 3.412
GenTerrorNw1 57 162 0.102 5.684
GenTerrorNw2 102 388 0.0753 7.608
GenTerrorNw3 105 590 0.108 11.238
GenTerrorNw4 135 556 0.0615 8.237
URV E-Mail 1, 133 5, 541 0.00864 9.781
CA-NetSci 1, 463 2, 743 0.00256 3.750
B Increasing the Fragility of Networks
In our experiments, we showed that our algorithm was able to sig-
nificantly increase the network-wide degree centrality by remov-
ing nodes - hence increasing the fragile function with respect to
a given network. In each of the five real-world terrorist networks
that we examined, removal of only 12% of nodes can increase the
network-wide centrality between 17% and 45% (see Figures 3-7).
In Figure 2 we show a visualization of how the Tanzania network
becomes more “star-like” with subsequent removal of nodes by the
greedy algorithm.
Figure 2: Visualization of the Tanzania network after nodes re-
moved by GREEDY FRAGILE. Panel A shows the original net-
work. Panel B shows the network after 3 nodes are removed, panel
C shows the network after 5 nodes are removed, and panel D shows
the network after 9 nodes are removed. Notice that the network
becomes more “star-like” after subsequent node removals. In our
experiment, after GREEDY FRAGILE removed 11 of the nodes
in the network, it took the topology of a star.
For comparison, we also looked at the removal of high degree,
closeness, and betweenness nodes. Removal of high-degree, close-
ness, or betweenness nodes tended to increase the network-wide
centrality. In other words, traditional efforts of targeting lead-
ership without first conducting shaping operations may actually
increase the organization’s ability to regenerate leadership - as
such targeting operations effectively cause an organization to de-
centralize. We display these results graphically in Figures 3-7.
Notice that GREEDY FRAGILE consistently causes an increase
in the network-wide degree centrality. An analysis of variance
(ANOVA) reveals that there is a significant difference in the per-
formance among our algorithm and the centrality measures with
respect to increase or decrease in network-wide degree centrality
(p-value less than 2.2 ·10−16, calculated with R version 2.13). Ad-
ditionally, pairwise analysis conducted using Tukey’s Honest Sig-
nificant Difference (HSD) test indicates that the results of our al-
gorithm differ significantly from any of the three centrality mea-
sures with a probability approaching 1.0 (95% confidence, calcu-
lated with R version 2.13). Typically, the ratio of percent increase
in fragility to the percent of removed nodes is typically 2 : 1 or
greater.
Figure 3: Percent of nodes removed vs. percent increase in fragility
for the Tanzania network using GREEDY FRAGILE, top degree,
top closeness, and top betweenness. The scale of the x-axis is po-
sitioned at 0%.
C Runtime
We also evaluated the run-time of the GREEDY FRAGILE algo-
rithm. With the largest terror network considered (GenTerrorNw4),
we achieved short runtime (under 7 seconds) on standard com-
modity hardware (see Figure 8). Hence, in terms of runtime, our
algorithm is practical for use by a real-world analyst. As pre-
dicted in our time complexity result, we found that the runtime
of GREEDY FRAGILE increases with the number of nodes re-
moved. We note that the implementations of top degree, closeness,
and betweenness calculate those measures for the entire network at
once - hence increasing the number of nodes to remove does not
affect their runtime.
D Experiments on Large Data-Sets
To study the scalability ofGREEDY FRAGILE, we also employed
it on two large social networks. Note that these datasets are not
terrorist or insurgent networks. However, the larger size of these
6
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Figure 4: Percent of nodes removed vs. percent increase in fragility
for the GenTerrorNet1 network using GREEDY FRAGILE, top
degree, top closeness, and top betweenness. The scale of the x-axis
is positioned at 0%.
datasets is meant to illustrate how well our approach scales. For
these experiments, we used an e-mail network from University
Rovira i Virgili (URV E-Mail) [9] and a Network Science col-
laboration network (CA-NetSci) from [10] (see Table 1). In Fig-
ure 9 we show the percentage of nodes removed vs. the percent
increase in fragility. We note that 2 : 1 ratio of percent increase in
fragility to the percent of removed nodes appears to be maintained
even in these large datasets. In Figure 10 we show the runtime for
GREEDY FRAGILE on the two large networks. We note that the
behavior of runtime vs. number of nodes removed resembles that
of the GenTerrorNw4 network from the previous section. Also of
interest is that the algorithm was able to handle networks of over a
thousand nodes in about 20 minutes on commodity hardware.
V Related Work
Various aspects of the resiliency of terrorist networks have been
previously explored in the literature. For instance, [11] studies the
ability such network to facilitate communication while maintain-
ing secrecy while [12] studies how such networks are resilient to
cascades. However, to our knowledge, the network-wide degree
centrality in such networks - and how to increase this property -
has not been previously studied.
There has been much work dealing with the removal of nodes
from a network to maximize fragmentation [13, 14, 15] where the
nodes removed are mean to either increase fragmentation of the
network or reduce the size of the largest connected component.
While this work has many applications, it is important to note that
there are special considerations of terrorist and insurgent networks
that we must account for in a targeting strategy. For instance, if
conducting a counter-intelligence operation while targeting, as in
the case of [3], it may be desirable to preserve some amount of
Figure 5: Percent of nodes removed vs. percent increase in fragility
for the GenTerrorNw2 network using GREEDY FRAGILE, top
degree, top closeness, and top betweenness. The scale of the x-axis
is positioned at 0%.
connectivity in the network. Additionally, fragmentation of a net-
work may result in the splintering of an organization into smaller,
but more radical and deadly organizations. This happens because
in some cases, it may be desirable to keep certain terrorist or in-
surgent leaders in place to restrain certain, more radical elements
of their organization. Such splinter was observed for the insurgent
organization Jaysh al-Mahdi in Iraq [16]. Further, these techniques
do not specifically address the issue of emerging leaders. Hence, if
they were to be used for counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency,
they would likely still benefit from a shaping operation to reduce
organization’s ability to regenerate leadership.
There has been some previous work on identifying emerging
leaders in terrorist networks. Although such an approach could
be useful in identifying certain leaders, it does not account the or-
ganizations ability as a whole to regenerate leadership. In [2], the
topic of cognitive demand is studied. The cognitive load of an indi-
vidual deals with their ability to handle multiple demands on their
time and work on complex tasks. Typically, this can be obtained
by studying networks where the nodes may represent more than in-
dividual people - but tasks, events, and responsibilities. However,
it may often be the case that this type of information is often lim-
ited or non-existent in many situations. Additionally, as discussed
throughout this paper, the targeting of individual nodes may often
not be possible for various reasons. Hence, our framework, that fo-
cuses on the network’s ability to regenerate leadership as opposed
to finding individual emerging leaders may be more useful as we
can restrict the available nodes in our search using the “no strike
list.” By removing these nodes from targeting consideration - but
by still considering their structural role - our framework allows a
security force to reduce the regenerative ability of a terror network
by “working around” individuals that may not be targeted.
In more recent work [17] looks at the problem of removing lead-
ership nodes from a terrorist or criminal network in a manner that
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Figure 6: Percent of nodes removed vs. percent increase in fragility
for the GenTerrorNw3 network using GREEDY FRAGILE, top
degree, top closeness, and top betweenness. The scale of the x-axis
is positioned at 0%.
accounts for new links created in the aftermath of an operation.
Additionally, [18] look at identifying leaders in covert terrorist net-
work who attempt to minimize their communication due to the
clandestine nature of their operations. They do this by introduc-
ing a new centrality measure called “covertness centrality.” Both
of these approaches are complementary to ours as they focus on
the leadership of the terrorist or insurgent group - as this approach
focuses on the networks ability to re-generate leadership. A more
complete integration of this approach leadership targeting method
such as these (i.e. using a network-wide version of covertness cen-
trality) is an obvious direction for future work.
VI Conclusions
In this paper we described how to target nodes in a terrorist or insur-
gent network as part of a shaping operation designed to reduce the
organization’s ability to regenerate leadership. Our key intuition
was to increase the network-wide degree centrality which would
likely have the effect of eliminating emerging leaders as maximiz-
ing this quantity would intuitively increase the organization’s re-
liance on a single leader. In this paper, we found that though identi-
fying a set of nodes to maximize this network-wide degree central-
ity is NP-hard, our greedy approach proved to be a viable heuris-
tic for this problem, increasing this quantity between 17% − 45%
in our experiments. Future work could include an examination of
other types of network-wide centrality – for instance network-wide
closeness centrality – instead of network-wide degree centrality.
Another aspect that we are considering in ongoing research is de-
termining the effectiveness of the shaping strategy when we have
observed only part of the terrorist or insurgent organization – as is
often the case as such networks are created from intelligence data.
Figure 7: Percent of nodes removed vs. percent increase in fragility
for the GenTerrorNw4 network using GREEDY FRAGILE, top
degree, top closeness, and top betweenness. The scale of the x-axis
is positioned at 0%.
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